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KIROLA v. THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

This document, portion of document or clip from legal proceedings may not represent all of the facts, documents, opinions, judgments or other information that is pertinent to this case. The entire case, including all court records, expert reports, etc. should be reviewed together and a qualified attorney consulted before any interpretation is made about how to apply this information to any specific circumstances.

2. Redressability

56. Even if Kirola had suffered an actual ADA injury, she has not shown redressability, as required under Lujan. In order to demonstrate redressability, a plaintiff must show that plaintiff "personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103 n.5 (1998) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975)). Furthermore, any "remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996).

57. Kirola seeks a broad permanent injunction relating to virtually every aspect of the City's operation and management of its facilities, programs and services. Dkt. 635. However, the nexus between Kirola's injury and the relief sought is lacking.

58. With regard to curb ramps, Kirola seeks an injunction requiring the City to, within ten years of judgment, construct an accessible curb ramp at every existing or potential curb ramp location, except for those locations where the City is able to document that a curb ramp is not required. Dkt. 632, 2:24-3:10.19 But curb ramp saturation—which is not required under the ADA—is already part of the Curb Ramp and Sidewalk Transition Plan. Although the City's curb ramp transition plan does not contain a specific deadline for completion, the City anticipates achieving curb ramp saturation within approximately twelve years. Dkt. 657, 4:12-13. There is no evidence that the marginally expedited deadline (ten vs. twelve years) proposed by Kirola would redress any supposed injury she suffered due to missing curb ramps. In fact, Kirola's sole curb ramp request (for the corner of McAllister and Fillmore) was fulfilled in less than two years and would not have been constructed any sooner under her proposed injunction. RT 1383:19-1884:8, 1391:18-1392:2. As such, Kirola's proposed remedy would not have resulted in a more expeditious response to her request.20

59. Redressability also is absent with respect to Kirola's accessibility complaints pertaining to the City's sidewalks. Kirola proposes an injunction requiring the City to inspect and repair all sidewalk-related barriers along its 2,000 miles of sidewalk in 10 years, and thereafter implement a 15-year inspection cycle—rather than the current 25-year cycle under SIRP (the City's current sidewalk inspection plan). Dkt. 635, 5:1-5. She also insists that, within ninety days ofjudgment, the City identify alternative, accessible routes wherever the City contends that removal of a sidewalk barrier is unnecessary for program access. Dkt. 635, 4:6-27.

60. Underlying Kirola's proposal for a shorter inspection cycle is her failure to recognize that SIRP operates in tandem with ASAP (i.e., Accelerated Sidewalk Abatement Program). Whereas the SIRP is a "proactive" program in which the City seeks out sidewalks in need of repair, the ASAP is a "reactive" program in which the City repairs sidewalks in response to public complaints. RT 2453:18-2454:12. Accessibility complaints regarding sidewalks are given high priority and responded to immediately, and are typically resolved in ninety days. RT 2454:1-12. Here, Kirola never complained to the City about the three stretches of sidewalk she testified about. Had she done so, the trial record establishes that her complaints would likely have been addressed within a matter of months. The Court is thus unpersuaded that the remedy of requiring the repair of all sidewalks within ten years is necessary or would redress the harm allegedly caused by the three sidewalks about which Kirola testified.

61. With regard to the City's RecPark facilities and pools, Kirola seeks an injunction directing the City to: (1) conduct a survey of every pool, park and recreational facility in the City within nine months of judgment, identifying every facility containing a barrier under ADAAG; (2) prepare a program access plan within eighteen months; and (3) remove all barriers necessary to ensure program access in ten years. Dkt. 632, 7:12-28. Kirola has not established how this proposed remedy would redress any alleged injury.

62. Kirola complained about barriers at Balboa Pool, Garfield Pool and Rossi Pool. The law is clear that the City has no obligation under Title II of the ADA to ensure that each facility through which it offers its aquatics program is fully accessible. Nevertheless, at the time of trial, the City had already embarked on a barrier removal project at Garfield Pool, RT 1813:13-1814:4, and Rossi Pool and Balboa Pool have since been scheduled for barrier removal, Dkt. 658-1. As such, Kirola would not personally benefit in a tangible way from the Court's intervention, since the few barriers she encountered are already being addressed by the City on a more expeditious schedule as compared to her proposed remedy.

63. The same lack of redressability is evident in terms of Kirola's experience using City parks. The only park at which Kirola claimed to have encountered accessibility barriers was Alamo Square Park. RT 1385:5-15. Even if Kirola's vague testimony was sufficient to demonstrate that she was denied meaningful access to Alamo Square Park—which it is not—no showing has been made that her proposed remedy would correct those purported defects. In addition, a survey of Alamo Square Park to ascertain its compliance with ADAAG would not benefit Kirola because ADAAG's dimensional requirements do not apply to outdoor recreational facilities or open spaces. RT 2048:9-15; 2064:21-25.

64. Finally, with regard to the City's libraries, Kirola seeks an injunction requiring the City to: (1) complete work on both the Bayview Branch Library and the North Beach Branch Library within 2 years; and (2) rectify all alleged barriers identified by Kirola's experts within 120 days. Dkt. 632, 8:27-9:3. However, Kirola presented no evidence that she encountered any accessibility barriers at either of these libraries, or that she has ever attempted, let alone desires, to use either facility. Nor does her proposed injunction bear any relation to the injury she allegedly sustained as a result of having encountered misplaced step stools at three other libraries. As for the second aspect of the proposed remedy, i.e., to rectify barriers identified by her experts, none of them cited the presence of step stools in library aisles. As such, Kirola's proposed remedy regarding the library system would not address her alleged injury, i.e., encountering stools in the stacks at three other libraries.

65. The Court concludes that Kirola has failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that any of her injuries resulting from the alleged denial of meaningful access will be remedied by the relief she seeks in this action. Sprint Commc'n Co., 554 U.S. at 274-75. Thus, independent of her failure to demonstrate that she suffered an injury in fact, Kirola lacks standing based on her failure to prove redressability.

 

19. Kirola asserts that she selected the ten-year time frame to allow the City to plan barrier removal in harmony with its existing ten-year capital planning process. Dkt. 672, 14:28-15:3. Trial testimony shows, however, that the City's ten-year capital plan is a mere planning tool, not a set schedule or budget, and that the City prepares a new ten-year plan each year. RT 1511:4-14, 1534:19-25.

20. Kirola also complains that the City's Paving Guidelines inappropriately allow the City to defer curb ramp installation in connection with a street paving project for up to twenty-four months when a pre-planned project would require demolition of a newly constructed curb ramp. DTX N23 [000003]. She proposes an injunction eliminating this deferment. Dkt. 635, 5:5-20. However, Kirola acknowledges that, despite having lived in San Francisco for almost twenty years, she has "not yet encountered an inaccessible corner or curb ramp" as a result of the Paving Guidelines or shown that she is likely to do so in the future. Dkt. 672, 18:17-18. Further, no evidence was presented at trial showing that the City has actually deferred installation of a curb ramp under this policy.

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