White House Testimony
During the next five weeks, executive agencies reviewed the bill to make recommendations for an administration position. Unlike Congress, which follows a fairly organized if messy deliberative process to reconcile the views of two legislative bodies, party leaders, congressional committees, and individual members, developing an administration position involves an organic process of synthesizing input from senior officials and staff in both the Executive Office of the President and among Cabinet agencies and non-Cabinet agencies. A final administration position is often determined as much the force of personality, influence, and respect of key officials as according to specific position in a decision-making structure.
The key to the ADA in the White House was Chief Counsel C. Boyden Gray, who had previously served as Bush’s counsel for eight years during the Reagan administration. They became close friends and shared similar family backgrounds: their fathers were golf partners. Their relationship gave Gray considerable influence. “Boyden is the most powerful counsel to a president we’ve had in a long, long time,” said Gray’s immediate predecessor during the Reagan administration, A.B. Culvahouse. Gray was selective in the issues which he engaged. But “on the issues Boyden has chosen,” said Culvahouse, “he is awfully damned influential."56 And, based on his friendship with Evan Kemp and following his experience with President Reagan’s Task Force on Regulatory Relief, Gray took a keen interest in the ADA.57
White House action on the ADA was framed by President Bush’s declarations in support of disability rights legislation. This was a relatively unique interest for Bush, as he was best known and respected for his expertise on, and passion for, foreign policy. The question, said Dr. William Roper, who worked for Porter on the Domestic Policy Council, was precisely how Bush’s commitments would be translated into specific policy. There were discussions about the extent to which the administration would abide by the campaign promise. But Bush was steadfast in his commitment to getting a solid act passed. “He wanted it done in a way that was good for the American people,” said Roper: “this was not going to be a shell promise."58
Others inside the White House were much less enamored with the ADA, and had substantive reservations. Civil rights was a charged issue in the Bush administration. Kemp explained that the White House would not entertain any concept of “quotas” with regard to the ADA. Officials within the Bush administration emphasized that people with disabilities needed to be qualified for any given job, that the original ADA definition needed to be limited, and that there needed to be a sensible limit to the responsibility of providing reasonable accommodations. If these fundamental issues were settled, said Kemp, the White House could move forward with shaping the details.59 As White House consultant Robert Funk explained, Funk, Gray, and others reminded skeptics of Bush’s promise.60 In addition to Gray, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh was a crucial advocate of the ADA and Bush’s aspirations. So was Kemp, who functioned as a vital link between the disability community and the White House.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) organized the various recommendations made by executive agencies, and Attorney General Thornburgh became the point person to represent the administration. Thornburgh, as many others, had personal experience with disability. His son, Peter, had acquired a learning disability from an automobile accident. As parents, Thornburgh and his wife Ginny had moved from caring for the special needs of their own son to working for others with similar conditions. In Pennsylvania, Mrs. Thornburgh had served as county chairperson of the ARC and was a member of President Reagan’s Committee on Mental Retardation. Her work influenced her husband, who used his authority as Governor of Pennsylvania to assist persons with disabilities.61
At the Senate hearing on June 22, 1989, it was clear that those in support of the ADA within the White House prevailed in shaping the administration’s position, which was presented by Attorney General Thornburgh. “We at the Department of Justice,” Thornburgh said, “wholeheartedly share [the ADA’s] goals and commit ourselves, along with the president and the rest of his administration, to a bipartisan effort to enact comprehensive legislation attacking discrimination in employment, public services, transportation, public accommodations, and telecommunications.” He explained that granting civil rights to disabled persons would help the American economy by promoting employment instead of dependence. Moreover, Thornburgh declared the administration’s support of every basic principle, as well as to the overall principle of linking the bill to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. He also identified areas of concern: drug-abusers should not be covered by the definition of disability; measures should be taken to ameliorate the burden on small businesses; the extension of public accommodations beyond the Civil Rights Act should be carefully analyzed; attempts should be made to minimize litigation; the Secretary of Transportation should be able to grant exemptions to transit systems; and “the most cost-effective and efficient system” of telecommunications should be pursued. Most significantly, however, Thornburgh pledged to begin working, both at the staff and principal levels,§§ to work toward bipartisan consensus on the ADA.62
Although there were pronounced differences between ADA sponsors and the Bush administration, Senator Harkin responded to Attorney General Thornburgh by emphasizing all the areas of agreement. Accordingly, a Washington Post headline declared: “Thornburgh Endorses Civil Rights Protection for the Disabled."63 This statement masked deep divisions, but it effectively identified the ADA’s advances and potential.
Attorney General Thornburgh’s testimony was crucial because it demonstrated that the Bush administration was willing to work toward consensus on a bill that President Bush could endorse. Senators Harkin and Kennedy eagerly accepted the invitation to open negotiations with the Bush administration. And, as a result of Thornburgh’s testimony, Senators Dole and Hatch laid to rest the possibilities of introducing competing bills. The ADA, sweeping in its provisions, emerged from the hearings with virtually every witness supporting the concept of the bill. Every argument against the ADA met with an effective rebuttal. The ADA was sound and it was on the move.
§§ “Principals” refer to persons of high-level offices, for example Senators, Congressmen, and top administrators. Traditionally, meetings between the House and Senate and between Congress and the administration require same-level discussions. Thus, a Senator would not open negotiations with a staff member of the administration. Staff members meet with staff members, principals meet with principals.
56. Quoted in Owen Ullmann, “Soul Brothers,” The Washingtonian, May 1992, p. 78.
57. Boyden Gray, interview, October 24, 1996.
58. William Roper, interview, December 2, 1996.
59. Evan Kemp, telephone conversation with author, May 21, 1997.
60. Robert Funk, interview, February 3, 1997.
61. Richard Thornburgh, interview, October 22, 1996.
62. Richard Thornburgh, statement, Senate Hrgs. (June 22, 1989), p. 195, 201.
63. Marcus, “Thornburgh Endorses Civil Rights Protection for the Disabled,” p. A8.
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