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Protecting the Rights of Parents and Prospective Parents with Disabilities: Technical Assistance for State and Local Child Welfare Agencies and Courts

Application

A child welfare agency or court may not, directly or through contract or other arrangements, engage in practices or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability, or that have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the child welfare agency’s or court’s program for persons with disabilities.19  Under these prohibitions, a child welfare agency could be responsible for the discriminatory actions of a private foster care or adoption agency with which it contracts when those actions are taken in fulfillment of the private entity’s contractual obligations with the child welfare agency.  For example, if the private foster care or adoption agency imposed discriminatory eligibility requirements for foster or adoptive parents that screened out prospective parents with HIV, the state child welfare agency would most likely be responsible for the contractor’s practice of discriminating on the basis of disability.

Two principles that are fundamental to Title II of the ADA and Section 504 are:
(1) individualized treatment; and (2) full and equal opportunity.  Both of these principles are of particular importance to the administration of child welfare programs.

Individualized treatment.  Individuals with disabilities must be treated on a case-by-case basis consistent with facts and objective evidence.20  Persons with disabilities may not be treated on the basis of generalizations or stereotypes.21  For example, prohibited treatment would include the removal of a child from a parent with a disability based on the stereotypical belief, unsupported by an individual assessment, that people with disabilities are unable to safely parent their children.  Another example would be denying a person with a disability the opportunity to become a foster or adoptive parent based on stereotypical beliefs about how the disability may affect the individual’s ability to provide appropriate care for a child.

Full and equal opportunity.  Individuals with disabilities must be provided opportunities to benefit from or participate in child welfare programs, services, and activities that are equal to those extended to individuals without disabilities.22  This principle can require the provision of aids, benefits, and services different from those provided to other parents and prospective parents where necessary to ensure an equal opportunity to obtain the same result or gain the same benefit, such as family reunification.23 

This does not mean lowering standards for individuals with disabilities; rather, in keeping with the requirements of individualized treatment, services must be adapted to meet the needs of a parent or prospective parent who has a disability to provide meaningful and equal access to the benefit. 24  In some cases, it may mean ensuring physical or programmatic accessibility or providing auxiliary aids and services to ensure adequate communication and participation, unless doing so would result in a fundamental alteration to the nature of the program or undue financial and administrative burden.25  For example, a child welfare agency must provide an interpreter for a father who is deaf when necessary to ensure that he can participate in all aspects of the child welfare interaction.  In other instances, this may mean making reasonable modifications to policies, procedures, or practices, unless doing so would result in a fundamental alteration to the nature of the program.26  For example, if a child welfare agency provides classes on feeding and bathing children and a mother with an intellectual disability needs a different method of instruction to learn the techniques, the agency should provide the mother with the method of teaching that she needs.

Under Title II of the ADA or Section 504, in some cases, a parent or prospective parent with a disability may not be appropriate for child placement because he or she poses a significant risk to the health or safety of the child that cannot be eliminated by a reasonable modification.27  This exception is consistent with the obligations of child welfare agencies and courts to ensure the safety of children.  However, both the ADA and Section 504 require that decisions about child safety and whether a parent or prospective parent represents a threat to safety must be based on an individualized assessment and objective facts, including the nature, duration, and severity of the risk to the child, and the probability that the potential injury to the child will actually occur.28  In addition, if the risk can be eliminated by a reasonable modification of policies, practices, or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services, the child welfare agency must take such mitigating actions.29  A public entity may impose legitimate safety requirements necessary for the safe operation of its services, programs, or activities, but they may not be based on stereotypes or generalizations about persons with disabilities.30

By applying these principles consistently in the child welfare system, child welfare agencies and courts can ensure that parents and prospective parents with disabilities have equal access to parenting opportunities while ensuring children safely remain in or are placed in safe and caring homes. The attached Questions and Answers provide more detailed information and specific implementation examples for child welfare agencies and courts.

19 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3); 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(4); ); see also 28 C.F.R. § 42.503(b)(3).

20 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b); see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App. B (explaining in the 1991 Section-by-Section guidance to the Title II regulation that, “[t]aken together, the[] provisions [in 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)] are intended to prohibit exclusion . . . of individuals with disabilities and the denial of equal opportunities enjoyed by others, based on, among other things, presumptions, patronizing attitudes, fears, and stereotypes about individuals with disabilities.  Consistent with these standards, public entities are required to ensure that their actions are based on facts applicable to individuals and not presumptions as to what a class of individuals with disabilities can or cannot do.”); School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 (1987).

21 See, e.g., id.

22 See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(1)(ii)-(iv), (vii), (b)(7); 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(1)(ii)-(iii); see also 28 C.F.R. § 42.503(b)(1)(ii), (iii).

23 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(ii)-(iv).

24 Id; see also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 

25  28 C.F.R. §§ 35.149-151, 160-164; 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.21-23, 84.52(d); see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.503(e), (f), 42.520-522.

26  See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.12(a), 84.22(a) and (f), and 84.52(d); and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).

27 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(a)-(b); Arline, 273 U.S. at 287.

28 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(b); Arline, 273 U.S. at 288.

29 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(b); Arline, 273 U.S. at 288.

30 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(h).

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