KIROLA v. THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

3. Testimony of Class Members

28. Kirola argues that she may satisfy her burden of demonstrating standing based on the experiences of persons other than herself; to wit, class members. Dkt. 672, 13:22-14:3. This contention also lacks merit. "[I]n class actions, the named representatives must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent." Pence v. Andrus, 586 F.2d 733, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1978) (internal citations omitted); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972) (holding that "the 'injury in fact' test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured."). As such, "if none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class." O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 494; Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894, 897 n.2*6767(9th Cir. 1995) ("if the representative parties do not have standing, the class does not have standing.").

29. Kirola cites Armstrong for the proposition that the experiences of other class members may be considered in assessing whether she has standing. Dkt. 672, 13:28. In Armstrong, a class of disabled prisoners and parolees brought a class action alleging that policies and practices related to parole and parole revocation hearings violated the ADA. 275 F.3d at 854-55. The Ninth Circuit held that when prospective injunctive relief is sought, the plaintiff must show not only that he suffered an actual injury, but also that he is "realistically threatened" with a repetition of the violation which led to that injury. Id. at 861-62. A likelihood of recurrence may be shown where the injury stems from a written policy or the harm is part of a pattern of officially sanctioned conduct. Id. at 861. In discussing the latter theory of recurrence, the court explained that "[w]hen a named plaintiff asserts injuries that have been inflicted upon a class of plaintiffs, [the court] may consider those injuries in the context of the harm asserted by the class as a whole, to determine whether a credible threat that the named plaintiff's injury will recur has been established." Id.

30. Kirola's analysis of Armstrong mixes apples with oranges. Armstrong discusses two separate components to standing: First, the named plaintiff's actual injury ; and second, the realistic threat of repetition, i.e., whether the plaintiff's injury is likely to recur, which applies where injunctive relief is sought. Id. at 860-61. The court found that in connection with the latter, injuries suffered by class members may be pertinent. Id. at 861. Significantly, nowhere in its opinion did the Armstrong court state that the threshold inquiry of whether the named plaintiff suffered an injury in fact may be analyzed based on evidence of harm sustained by the class. Armstrong thus provides no support for Kirola's claim that the Court must consider the experiences of class members in determining whether the named plaintiff suffered an actual injury. The Court therefore declines to consider the testimony of other class members in assessing whether Kirola satisfied her burden of establishing that she "personally" has been injured as a result of the policies and practices at issue in this case. See Pence, 586 F.2d at 736-37 (holding that a named class representative's standing must be based on the injury he sustained, as opposed to those suffered by class members).