First Victory
Sometimes, as in basketball, the best way to launch an offensive assault is to get a good defensive stop—a steal, a forced turnover. President Reagan’s Task Force on Regulatory Relief provided just such an opportunity. No single president since Franklin Roosevelt, wrote one historian, “altered the political landscape so radically and in such a short period” as did Reagan.43 He entered office on January 21, 1981, with the support of a business coalition dedicated to rescuing a languishing, inflation ridden economy. To Reagan, government was primarily an “obstacle to personal achievement and opportunity.” Alternatively, he promoted the idea of the “selfreliant, self-made individual."44 For domestic policy, Reagan proposed and obtained the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. This act provided deep personal and corporate tax cuts that primarily benefitted the wealthiest Americans, on the assumption that wealth would trickle down to assist lower-income persons.
By insisting on a combination of tax cuts and vast increases in military spending, President Reagan was able to force a reduction in federal, domestic expenditures. Thus, in addition to freeing up business through tax cuts, Reagan wanted to roll back the development of the welfare state by advocating reductions in social spending. He achieved this aim through the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), which cut $140 billion from the federal budget through Fiscal Year 1985. Reagan also hoped to aid businesses, school boards, and government units through a deregulation campaign: the Task Force on Regulatory Relief. He appointed Vice President Bush to lead these endeavors, who in turn designated his chief counsel, C. Boyden Gray, to take charge. Over 150 different pieces of enacted legislation were targeted for analysis.45
As Kemp observed, President Reagan’s emphasis on self-reliance and rugged individualism resonated with some aspects of the disability rights movement.46 But Reagan’s initiatives did not generally offer hope to the disability community. Reagan’s civil rights record, for example, was cause for concern: he had won his way to the California governorship in part by standing against student and civil rights protests in the 1960s. And his Task Force on Regulatory Relief posed a direct threat to the civil rights gains of the disability community. Three of the early targets of the task force were the Section 504 regulations, the Education for all Handicapped Children Act (P.L. 94-142), and the regulations for the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (ATBCB). Although the ATBCB regulations were relatively technical and non-controversial, changes to Section 504 and P.L. 94-142 regulations had potentially staggering implications.
Section 504 was now known by many as “the Civil Rights Law for the Handicapped."47 Any changes to it would be a major defeat and could have dire consequences for other civil rights regulations. As one civil rights attorney explained, persons in the disability community thought the Reagan administration started with disability regulations because “they thought the disability community was the least well organized and they could slip these regulations through and use them as precedents for other regulations."48 Deregulation of P.L. 94-142 posed an additional threat to the educational prospects of persons with disabilities, which in turn might jeopardize employment opportunities. The administration also considered introducing legislation limiting the level of service for, and individual attention to, persons with disabilities in the educational process.49
Prior to becoming chief counsel to Vice President Bush, Gray had no experience with disability policy. But these regulations immersed him in it, and he gained a new education. The Task Force started with Section 504. By January, 1982, Gray had received a draft of proposed changes from the Department of Justice (DOJ). This draft was leaked, however, and came into the hands of disability organizations, including DREDF. Wright and Funk convened a meeting of nine disability organizations to discuss the proposals, which decided to have DREDF lead the fight.
In March, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) supplied DREDF with extra ammunition: a leak of OMB’s proposed changes. OMB’s proposals included a provision that would allow federal grant recipients, in certain cases, to weigh the cost of an accommodation against the “social value” of the person involved. “This was a cost-benefit analysis of how human you are,” said Funk. DREDF worked with such organizations as NCIL and ARC to help mobilize disability groups all over the country to protest by writing letters. For NCIL, which was founded that year, this was one of the first opportunities to join other organizations in national advocacy efforts. In Washington, Wright and Funk met extensively with Gray to discuss the details and ramifications of changing the regulations. They were joined by Kemp, who brought a trump card to the table: himself. For over a decade, Gray and Kemp had been bridge partners and had become close friends. Kemp built on this relationship to persuade Gray against permitting damaging alterations to Section 504 and P.L. 94-142. Gray consequently became a mediating force between those rewriting the regulations and the disability lobbyists.50
The controversy intensified later in the fall when the Task Force began consideration of the education provisions. Parents of persons with disabilities were outraged and united with other disability advocates to resist President Reagan’s actions. Persons in the disability community organized a nationwide, grassroots letter-writing campaign and flooded the White House with letters—over 40,000 by 1983. As part of the review process, Gray held hearings throughout the country. Thousands of persons and parents of persons with disabilities attended to demonstrate their opposition. They presented testimony explaining the harm that would be caused by changing the regulations. One two-inch-tall Los Angeles headline declared: “Parents of Disabled Children Boo Reagan Proposals."51 Congress joined these efforts by sending a letter signed by majorities in both chambers urging the president to support the full funding of P.L. 94-142. House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel helped arrange a meeting between Sally Hoerr, president of the Illinois Alliance for Exceptional Children and Adults, and Chief of Staff James A. Baker, III, to enable Hoerr to articulate her opposition.
By January, 1983, Gray had a final draft of the proposed revisions in his hands, but Kemp and Wright pleaded with Gray not to make the changes. Two months later, in part because of Gray’s influence, Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, finally agreed to abandon the regulatory efforts.52 And on March 21, Vice President Bush wrote a letter to Kemp informing him that Section 504 and P.L. 94-142 would be left untouched. Bush explained that conversations with members of Congress and with the disability community made him understand the negative impact such changes would have. Especially helpful, Bush said, were the comments of persons with disabilities and their families. “Your commitment to equal opportunity for disabled citizens to achieve their full potential as independent, productive citizens is fully shared by this Administration,” he told Kemp.53
This was a huge victory, a big defensive stop. And it was important not simply for the content of the regulations. What had started out as a threat to roll back years of gains served to unite the disability community. For the first time persons and parents of persons with disabilities and scores of different organizations joined together for a common cause, to defend disability rights. “It showed the disability community that there was a reason to write in all those responses to alerts,” Mayerson said, “and it showed the Administration that there was a political element here as well as a legal righteousness in the cause."54 Gray concurred: “One of the things I found is [that] the disability community . . . wanted to be treated as a potent political force just like any other force. [It] was part of the empowerment."55
This two-year process was also crucial for the relationships it fostered. Wright, Funk, and Kemp were now close allies. During the ADA deliberations, Funk and Kemp would be working within the administration instead of lobbying it from the outside—respectively as a White House negotiator and Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). They would be important links for the disability community. Moreover, through the efforts of Wright, Funk, Kemp, Mayerson, and thousands of Americans, Gray and Vice President Bush had earned a valuable education that would prove indispensable during the deliberations over the ADA. Gray marveled at how Bush “intuitively grasped” disability issues.56 Gray and Bush also became genuinely interested in disability issues. Bush, for example, began asking Kemp to write his speeches when he spoke before disability groups, which enabled him to develop relationships with others in the disability community.57
43. William C. Berman, America’s Right Turn: From Nixon to Bush (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 118.
44. Ibid., p. 88.
45. Boyden Gray, interview, October 23, 1996.
46. Evan J. Kemp Jr., “Stop ‘Caring for’ the Disabled,” The Washington Post, June 7, 1981.
47. DeJong and Lifchez, “Physical Disability and Public Policy,” p. 40.
48. Rochelle L. Stanfield, “Reagan Courting Women, Minorities, But It May Be Too Late to Win Them,” National Journal, May 28, 1983, p. 1121.
49. Charles R. Babcock, “Handicapped Policy Undergoing a Rewrite,” The Washington Post, March 4, 1982, p. A27.
50. Felicity Barringer, “How Handicapped Won Access Rule Fight,” The Washington Post, April 12, 1983, p. A8.
51. Mayerson, interview, October 13, 1993.
52. Barringer, “How Handicapped Won Access Rule Fight,” p. A8.
53. Vice President George Bush to Mr. Evan Kemp, Jr., March 21, 1983, in possession of Evan Kemp.
54. Mayerson, interview, October 13, 1993.
55. Gray, interview, October 23, 1996.
56. Ibid.
57. Evan Kemp, interview, December 16, 1996.
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